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Abstract:	Understanding	 legal	 regulation	on	 sexual	practices	 is	 a	 field	 in	 its	 infancy.	 In	
this	paper	we	analyze	the	factors	driving	these	sexual	regulations	using	a	novel	dataset	
for	the	U.S.	for	the	years	1990	to	2010.	We	first	introduce	the	index	of	sexual	regulation	
(ISR)	 and	 then	 using	 a	 spatial	 lag	 fixed	 effects	 estimator	 that	 accounts	 for	 spillover	
effects	 from	 neighboring	 states,	 we	 find	 that	 citizen’s	 ideology,	 population	 density,	
household	income	and	median	age	are	associated	with	a	weaker	sexual	regulation	while	
government	ideology	has	a	slight	positive	association	with	the	overall	sexual	regulation.	
We	also	examine	 two	dimensions	of	 sexual	practice	 regulation	 looking	at	 the	 index	of	
marriage	practice	regulation	(IMPR)	and	sex	crime	regulation	(ISCR).	In	the	case	of	IMPR,	
our	 findings	 indicate	 that	 a	 more	 liberal	 government	 ideology,	 a	 higher	 share	 of	
population	with	the	college	degree	and	a	higher	median	age	are	associated	with	a	more	
liberal	index	of	marriage	practice	regulation.		
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1 Introduction 
 
The study of regulations on individual sexual practices in economics is still at its 
infancy. Numerous scholars in other fields have investigated the possible outcomes of 
sexual regulations such as economic freedom, development, etc. They include Aldous 
Huxley (1932), Sigmund Freud (Freud, 1908: 2000-2004), Joseph Unwin (1935, 1940, 
1934), and Pitirim Sorokin (1956). All of these authors saw lax regulations on sexual 
practices as a detriment to economic outcomes with Unwin completing a thorough 
historical analysis. Unwin (1934) writes: “[E]ach society reduced its sexual opportunity 
to a minimum and, displaying great social energy, flourished greatly. Then it extended 
its sexual opportunity; its energy decreased, and faded away. The one outstanding 
feature of the whole story [from dozens of cases] is its unrelieved monotony”. Unwin 
(1934) further states: “[A]ny human society is free to choose either to display great 
energy or to enjoy sexual freedom; the evidence is that it cannot do both for more than 
one generation”.  While Unwin did some detailed observational work, the lack of 
in-depth analysis on sexual regulations is due to the lack of data that would allow for 
econometric analysis.  
Recently, a study measuring worldwide trends in the regulation of sexual crimes was 
completed for 194 countries from 1945 to 2005. The study looked at sex-law reforms 
along four dimensions, adultery, sodomy, rape, and child sexual abuse (Frank et al., 
2010), finding a loosening of regulations regarding adultery and sodomy, but a 
tightening of the criminal code on rape and child sexual abuse. According to the 
authors, the former would indicate a change in the understanding of sex from a 
procreational/family role to an individual role. Ruger and Sorens (2016) develop a 
comprehensive Index of Personal and Economic Freedom for the 50 U.S. states. 
Originally, the index covered regulations on prostitution and homosexual marriage 
only but, then, it has been extended to cousin marriage (albeit for a limited number of 
years).   
Bose (2015) develops, for the US states, a broader measure of sexual practices’ 
regulations covering sixteen dimensions (“sexual freedom index”), for the period 
between 1990 to 2010. One of the contributions of the present paper is to extend and 
update the sexual freedom index developed by Bose (2015). Second, we aim to identify 
those factors that influence the regulation on marriage practices and that on sex crimes. 
Third, our paper improves upon the econometric analysis by controlling for possible 
influences across neighboring states (“spillovers”) in the regulation of sexual practices 
and idiosyncratic state heterogeneity using a spatial autoregressive panel data 
regression model and including state fixed effects. We find that citizens’ ideology, 
population density, household income and median age are associated with a weaker 
sexual regulation while government ideology has a slightly positive association with 
the sexual practices regulation. In the case of marriage practice regulation, our findings 
indicate that a more leftist government ideology, a higher share of population with the 
college degree and a higher median age are associated with a more liberal regulation. 
We also find that spatial spillover effects for both dimensions of regulation (marriage 
practice and sex crimes) are statistically significant, implying that the change of sexual 
practices’ regulation is affected by the reforms implemented in neighboring states. One 
channel through which this spillover could occur is the movement of workers across 
state borders.    
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Section 2 provides a literature review. Section 3 describes the data used in our 
analysis. Section 4 provides the model. Section 5 shows the results from the spatial 
panel regressions. Section 6 concludes.   
2 Literature Review 
In the economic literature, the legal discipline on divorce and homosexuality are the 
dimensions of sexual practices regulation that have gained attention. Other sexual 
practices such as prostitution, adultery, fornication, etc., have been object of economic 
analysis but from a theoretical perspective only (Posner, 2007, Cameron, 2002). This 
section deals with norms, laws, and dead letter laws concerning sexual practices 
defined in a broad sense, building up a general framework useful for the creation of the 
index of sexual practices’ regulation which is introduced below.  
2.1 Norms, Laws, and Sexual Regulations 
One of the issues that come up when dealing with sexual regulations is dead letter 
laws, i.e. laws that are on the books, but possibly not enforced.   
Cohabitation and adultery, while de jure illegal in some states are de facto not strictly 
enforced by the states. However, there are many instances where cohabitation laws are 
indirectly enforced. For example, cohabitation laws come into play in child custody 
disputes and in divorce cases. In Muller v. Muller (711 N.W.2d 329 (2006) 474 Mich. 
1074) a circuit court in Michigan had ordered that “neither party shall have an 
unrelated member of the opposite sex overnight while having parenting time with the 
minor children,” while this decision was appealed all the way to the Supreme Court of 
Michigan, the higher court did not reverse the decision. Further, because court cases in 
the U.S. are only recorded when a case is appealed it is possible that occasional 
cohabitation and adultery cases are dealt with by the courts (see Coleman, 1991) but 
because it is not recorded it is unclear how many cases are actually litigated. In a news 
article, it was stated that the state of Virginia successfully prosecuted eight cases for 
adultery in a decade1. Hence, one must be careful not to assume a law is dead.    
This research is relevant to a larger discussion about the relationship between law 
and social norms. Strong social norms create pressures that constrain the behavior of 
individuals. The threat of social ostracism and shame are powerful forces for social 
conformity. In a common law system, the law is expected to reflect social norms. 
“According to an old principle in jurisprudence, judges must discover common law in 
social norms rather than invent law in light of their own preferences” (Cooter, 1997). 
The law then supplements the pressure that emerges from social norms. 
Private enforcement and state enforcement typically complement each other.  The 
cooperation of citizens with officials increases the effectiveness of state enforcement and 
lowers its costs; the backing of state officials increases the effectiveness of private 
enforcement and lowers its risks. Conversely, laws that are inconsistent with social 
norms are perceived as irrelevant or unjust by many citizens, who then are reluctant to 
help the state detect and punish individuals who break such laws (Cooter, 1997).  
When laws support social norms, they are more likely to be enforced. When laws 
conflict with social norms, they are more likely to be disobeyed and under-enforced. 
                                                
1 https://www.apnews.com/98fba5471a8d47f5803c190b79fcd27b (accessed May 10, 2018).   
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Social norms create significant social pressure, and they do not emerge from law. Thus, 
our attempt to measure law on sexual practices is an imperfect method for measuring 
freedom. When measuring regulations on sexual practices, it is important to recognize 
that private enforcement of social norms reduces human freedom regardless of state 
enforcement. Posner notes that “norm internalization reduces human freedom, viewed 
functionally in terms of scope of choice rather than formalistically as freedom from legal 
constraints” (Posner, 1997).   
To achieve a better proxy of social norms, it is important to aim measurements 
toward smaller constituencies, and more democratic processes. Clearly a U.S. Supreme 
Court decision may not accurately reflect social norms because the Supreme Court is 
removed from any democratic process.  
Our measurement of sexual regulations should be directed at state level 
constituencies in order to more accurately reflect differences in social norms or median 
voter preferences as, it has been shown, they vary between states. Although Supreme 
Court decisions certainly influence state legislatures, our measure should focus on what 
is written in state laws. Although a Supreme Court decision may render a statute null, 
the index will not change values until the state legislature changes the law. Further, our 
index does reflect the decisions of state courts because state courts more closely reflect 
the preferences of the state voters than the federal courts. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 
(1973) provides an excellent example of conflicting desires between state and federal 
courts. Numerous states have instituted ‘trigger laws’ which would immediately 
recriminalize abortions if the Supreme Court were to overturn Roe v. Wade (Smock, 
2004). State politicians are more responsive to the median voter preferences within their 
state than the federal politicians. It is important to consider these complexities because 
they more closely reflect actual voter preferences. Voter preferences, in turn, more 
closely reflect the prevailing social norms.  
A telling example comes with the interracial marriage law in Alabama. In 2000, 
Alabama had a ballot measure to repeal an amendment in their constitution banning 
interracial marriage. The repeal passed with 59% of the vote.  This indicates that social 
norms in Alabama took a long time to change2 even though the Supreme Court 
legalized interracial marriage in 19673. 
It is also important to note that laws lag behind social norms. A certain behavior may 
be unacceptable under the prevailing social norms, but it may not become penalized in 
state law until it is apparent that the social norms are not sufficient for preventing 
breaches of the standard. This occurred in the 1800s with the issue of abortion where the 
Southern states in the U.S. did not have abortion laws because social norms were 
sufficiently strong to discourage abortions, whereas the Northeastern states did 
(Olasky, 1995).   
 
2.2 Economic and other literature on divorce and homosexuality 
Numerous economic papers have dealt with divorce laws, specifically, the shift from 
mutual consent to unilateral divorce, starting from the seminal work by Becker (1981). 
                                                
2 http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Alabama_Interracial_Marriage,_Amendment_2_%282000
%29  (accessed April 18, 2013).  
3 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 
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“Although divorce might seem more difficult when mutual consent is required than 
when either alone can divorce at will, the frequency and incidence of divorce should be 
similar with these and other rules if couples contemplating divorce can easily bargain 
with each other” (Becker, 1981).   
Various empirical studies have tested Becker’s hypothesis under low transaction 
costs. Peters (1986) finds that the change from mutual consent to unilateral divorce had 
no effect on the number of divorces in the U.S., but did affect compensation, i.e., 
spousal support at divorce is lower in unilateral states. By controlling for state and 
year-specific effects, Friedberg (1998) finds that the switch had a positive and 
permanent effect on the divorce rate. However, it only explains a 17% change in divorce 
rates.  Wolfers (2006) separates pre-existing time trends from dynamic effects of a 
policy shock, arguing that the effects identified by Friedberg (1998) are temporary and 
have no long-term consequence on the number of divorces. The pent-up demand for 
divorce is released with the law change and then trails off. 
However, another line of research suggests the Coasian approach is incomplete and 
that non- Coasian assumptions are needed, i.e. high cost of bargaining. For example, 
Rasul (2006) finds that marriage rates are lower under unilateral divorce. In the long 
run, the easing of divorce laws resulted in lower divorce rates due to the “selection 
effect” as individuals more carefully select their spouse. Allen et al. (2006) show that, in 
the U.S., the unilateral divorce regime increased the length of a spousal search by 1 to 2 
months. However, in the short run, easing divorce laws increased the existing stock of 
married couples divorcing, which is usually referred to as the “pipeline effect” (see also 
Wolfers 2006).   
Mataucha and Rasul (2008) study the “selective” and “incentive” effects on divorce 
within a model of contract marriage. They find that couples who marry after the 
enactment of unilateral divorce laws are less likely to divorce (due to the selection 
effect) than couples who married when the laws are passed and suddenly find 
themselves given a new incentive, an easier way out, complete with lower exit costs 
(this is the incentive effect4). It would follow that states adopting unilateral divorce 
would experience high divorce rates due to this incentive effect (see Rasul 2006).   
There is also an enormous literature in psychology, sociology, psychiatry, child 
development, etc., which shows that parental divorce is negatively related to a wide 
variety of children and households’ performance indicators. These include effects on 
educational attainment and learning capacity, effects on household income, increases in 
crime, abuse, and neglect and the resulting costs of state intervention, children’s health 
outcome (mental and emotional), and the effects of spiritual capital (see Fagan and 
Churchill 2012 for a review). While this literature is large, one must be careful about the 
casual interpretation as some of the outcomes in the observable variables could be due 
to unobservable features between those families that choose to divorce and those who 
do not divorce, leading to overestimating the effect of divorce. 
 There is a large literature on homosexuality in fields such as biology, genetics, 
psychiatry, neuroscience, psychology, political science, and gender studies. Tolerance 
towards homosexuality usually increases with the level of economic development; 
however, the poorer within these countries are less tolerant towards homosexuality 
(Andersen and Fetner, 2008).  Berggren and Nilsson (2013) also find that economic 
freedom is related to tolerance to homosexuality especially in the long run, but this is 
                                                
4 This is similar to the Pipeline effect as noted by Rasul (2006).   
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not true for other categories like race. Further, there is a large literature that delves into 
the compensations’ gap between heterosexual employees and non-heterosexual 
employees. In general, heterosexual men earn more than non-heterosexual men, but the 
results are reversed for women. This could be due to different discrimination patterns 
for men and women or other issues such as the role that child rearing might play.  
Some studies separate out heterosexual men who are married with heterosexual men 
who are cohabitating with a female and compares them to cohabiting homosexual men 
and women. These studies on compensation differentials are summarized in Botti and 
D’Ippoliti (2014). The Williams Institute of UCLA School of law has tried to measure the 
cost of homophobia, finding that this kind of discrimination negatively affects 
employers and government’s performance in terms of productivity, retention, 
recruitment, and public expenditure (Mallory et al. 2018).     
3 Model 
In this paper, we study the determinants of sexual practices regulation (ISR), and its 
underlying components -IMPR and ISCR- in a panel of US states. Our explanatory 
variables include measures for government and citizen ideology, state income and 
education levels, median age, population density, religious and racial fractionalization. 
In addition to being associated with state specific variables, a state’s regulation of these 
sexual practices can be influenced by the prevailing regulation in its neighboring states. 
A failure to account for these “spillover” effects can result in overstating the impact of a 
state’s own characteristics. We therefore allow for spatial spillovers by including a 
spatially lagged dependent variable. The spatial weights are based on state contiguity 
matrix. Further, there can be another source of an omitted variable bias due to 
state-specific unobserved heterogeneity. To control for this, we employ a fixed-effects 
estimation method. Thus, our estimating equation can be represented by the following 
specification: 
             
1 1
N K
it ij jt k kit i it
j k
s w s x vλ β µ
= =
= + + +∑ ∑                                (1) 
 
where its  is an individual dimension of the sexual practices’ regulation for state i at 
time t, ijw  is an element of the spatial weight matrix denoting the contiguity 
relationship between states i and j, kitx  denotes the set of covariates,  iν is a 
state-specific fixed effect, and  itµ is the idiosyncratic error term. All variables are first 
transformed through an orthogonal transformation to remove the fixed effects and then 
the model is estimated using a quasi-maximum likelihood estimator derived by Lee and 
Yu (2010).  
4 Data 
In this section we first focus on the dependent variable and then discuss the 
independent variables used in our analysis. 
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4.1 Dependent Variable 
Our dependent variables are the two components of the index of sexual regulations 
(ISR) –index of marriage practice regulation (IMPR), index of sex crime regulation 
(ISCR) as well as the ISR.  Defining and coding sexual freedom is both an art and a 
science. The measure of sexual regulations used is this paper comes from Bose (2015). 
Historically, both family law and criminal law has supported limiting sexual activity to 
the realm of marriage to protect the sanctity of marriage (Murray, 2009). Hence, the ISR 
is divided into two broad categories: marriage practice regulation5 and sex crime 
regulation (see Table 1). Each variable is coded on a four-point scale (0, 1, 2, 3). A value 
of 0 reflects the lowest level of freedom or the most stringent level of regulation, a value 
of three represents the highest level of freedom or no regulation. The variables are 
coded with a zero if, in a given state year, the behavior is punishable as a felony. The 
variable is coded with a one if the behavior is punishable as a misdemeanor, a two 
either if the behavior is punished as a petty crime, (minimal fine, no jail time) or if it is a 
misdemeanor in certain parts of the state and not in others. A petty offense is usually 
not considered a crime (Torcia, 1993). Finally, a behavior that is not punished in a given 
state year receives a value of three.   
 
Table	1:	 	 Variables	used	for	developing	the	ISR	and	the	category	each	variable	falls	under.	
Variables	 Category	
Adultery	 Marriage	Practice	
Bestiality	 	 Sex	Crime	
Homosexual	Marriage	(Civil	Unions)	 Marriage	Practice	
Recognition	of	Homosexual	Marriage	 Marriage	Practice	
Abortion	Prohibitions	 Sex	Crime	
Prostitution	Laws	for	Pimp	 Sex	Crime	
Prostitution	Laws	for	Prostitute	 Sex	Crime	
Prostitution	Laws	for	John	 Sex	Crime	
Polygamy	(Bigamy)	 Marriage	Practice	
Divorce	 Marriage	Practice	 	
Cohabitation	laws	 	 Marriage	Practice	 	
Miscegenation	laws	 Marriage	Practice	
Sodomy	Laws	 Sex	Crime	
Marrying	Close	Blood	(first	cousin)	 Marriage	Practice	
Fornication	Laws	 Sex	Crime	
Age	of	Consent	 Sex	Crime	
	 	
Certain variables, including most falling under the family law, could not be coded 
using the scale based on the distinction among felony/misdemeanor/petty crime. For 
each sexual practice, some discretionary coding has been applied. Many of the practices 
(relationships prevented to protect marriage) are prohibited in family or marriage law, 
                                                
5 The marriage freedom category reflects the changing laws instituted to protect the family by 
protecting the meaning of marriage to be of one male and one female in union. 
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but do not carry criminal penalties. For these variables, it has been necessary to adjust 
the coding method to consider the relative legal obstacles of obtaining legal recognition 
of certain relationships. For an outline of the coding procedure used for each variable 
see Table 2. 
 
Table	2:	 	 Coding	method	used	for	creating	the	Index	of	Sexual	Regulation.	
Variable	 0:	Most	Regulated	 1	 2	 3:	Least	Regulated	
General	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
Adultery,	Prostitution	
(pimps,	prostitutes,	
and	Johns),	Bestiality,	
Fornication,	
Cohabitation,	Sodomy,	
Polygamy,	
Miscegenation	
Felony Misdemeanor	 Misdemeanor	in	
limited	
regions/Petty	
Crime	
Not	a	Crime	
Age	of	Consent	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Minimum	age	that	
may	consent	to	legal	
sexual	activity)	
19	and up 17,	18	 15,	16	 14	and	under	
Close	Blood	Marriage	 Cousin	Marriage	
prohibited	in	all	
circumstances	
Cousin	Marriage	
allowed	with	
proof	of	infertility	
or	between	
person	over	the	
age	of	50	
		 Cousin	Marriage	
allowed	without	
reservations	
Divorce	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(requirements	for	legal	
divorce)	
Not	routinely	
allowed	
Fault Mutual	
Consent/No	
Fault	
None	(Unilateral)	
Homosexual	Marriage	 Prohibited	 Civil	Unions	 		 Allowed	
Abortion	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	
(Legality	of	Abortions	
in	the	absence	of	Roe	
v.	Wade)	
Prohibited 	 		 Allowed	
	
For each state, the value of ISR has been obtained as simple sum of various 
sub-components. The highest value attached to a state is equal to 48 (3x16). For the 
sub-indices of IMPR and ISCR, the highest score is 24 (3x8).  
We have made small changes to the Bose’s (2015) sexual freedom index based on 
updated data. Table 3 shows the average state level ISR. More than half of the states 
have seen an increase in sexual freedom between 1990 and 2010, while the other half 
have either kept the same level of regulation or show an increase in the stringency of 
sexual practices law.     
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Table	3:	State	level	summary	of	the	Index	of	Sexual	Regulation	
State	 Mean	 Std.	Dev	 Min	 	 Max	
Alabama	 24.05	 0.22	 24	 25	
Alaska	 30.00	 0.00	 30	 30	
Arizona	 19.90	 1.92	 18	 23	
Arkansas	 23.95	 1.02	 23	 25	
California	 29.00	 0.00	 29	 29	
Colorado	 24.00	 0.00	 24	 24	
Connecticut	 31.76	 2.23	 29	 37	
Delaware	 22.43	 1.08	 22	 25	
Florida	 22.00	 0.00	 22	 22	
Georgia	 23.86	 1.49	 22	 25	
Hawaii	 33.52	 0.51	 33	 34	
Idaho	 18.62	 0.80	 17	 19	
Illinois	 23.86	 1.49	 22	 25	
Indiana	 28.10	 1.14	 26	 29	
Iowa	 28.14	 1.93	 26	 32	
Kansas	 23.00	 0.00	 23	 23	
Kentucky	 24.81	 0.60	 23	 25	
Louisiana	 21.00	 0.00	 21	 21	
Maine	 27.19	 0.40	 27	 28	
Maryland	 28.43	 1.08	 28	 31	
Massachusetts	 16.29	 4.23	 13	 22	
Michigan	 14.00	 0.00	 14	 14	
Minnesota	 20.95	 1.02	 20	 22	
Mississippi	 15.62	 0.50	 15	 16	
Missouri	 23.33	 1.59	 22	 26	
Montana	 25.00	 1.45	 23	 26	
Nebraska	 27.05	 1.02	 26	 28	
Nevada	 30.14	 2.15	 25	 31	
New	Hampshire	 25.43	 1.96	 24	 29	
New	Jersey	 32.00	 0.00	 32	 32	
New	Mexico	 28.48	 0.51	 28	 29	
New	York	 26.00	 0.00	 26	 26	
North	Carolina	 19.71	 0.46	 19	 20	
North	Dakota	 21.38	 0.80	 21	 23	
Ohio	 32.95	 0.22	 32	 33	
Oklahoma	 17.00	 0.00	 17	 17	
Oregon	 26.05	 1.02	 25	 27	
Pennsylvania	 26.14	 1.01	 25	 28	
Rhode	Island	 24.57	 1.54	 23	 26	
South	Carolina	 21.00	 0.00	 21	 21	
South	Dakota	 26.14	 2.59	 22	 28	
Tennessee	 29.00	 2.26	 26	 31	
Texas	 27.00	 1.45	 26	 29	
Utah	 17.10	 0.62	 16	 18	
Vermont	 30.19	 0.87	 30	 34	
Virginia	 19.00	 0.00	 19	 19	
Washington	 25.57	 1.21	 25	 28	
West	Virginia	 20.76	 1.51	 20	 27	
Wisconsin	 18.19	 0.40	 18	 19	
Wyoming	 27.81	 0.40	 27	 28	
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During our period of study, Michigan, Mississippi and Ohio have the highest degree 
of regulation on sexual practices while Hawaii, New Jersey and Connecticut are the 
most liberal states. Figure 1 shows the average ISR value for the continental US states.  
 
Figure 1: Average Index of Sexual Regulation in USA 
 
 4.2 Independent Variable 
Our first set of independent variables are the two ideology variables. For government 
ideology, we used the ‘ADA/COPE measure of state government ideology’ (Berry et al., 
1998). The larger the number in both instances, the more leftist/liberal the active 
electorate or state government is in that state. The citizen’s ideology measure come from 
Richard Fording’s website6. The citizen ideology is the ‘revised 1960-2010 citizen 
ideology series’ (Berry et al. 1998).   
Other state level variables include income, education, median age of population and 
population density. For income we use median household income from the U.S. Census 
Bureau (2011 CPI-U-RS adjusted dollars). Education data is the percent with Bachelor’s 
degree over age 25 from the Census Bureau.  Other two variables, the median age of 
the population in the state and population density are from the Census and stateminder 
website7.   
Regarding the two fractionalization variables, the religious fractionalization variable 
is based on religion variables and includes % Catholic, % Evangelical, % Protestant 
(mainline), % Jews and % other.  This data comes from the Association of Religion 
Data Archives8.   The religion variables come out for every decade and interpolation is 
used for the in between years.  We also construct an index of fractionalization of race 
variables using variables which includes % White non-Hispanic, % Black, and % 
Hispanic. This data comes from U.S. Census Bureau (population division). Table 3 and 4 
show the summary statistics and the correlation coefficients respectively.   
  
                                                
6 http://rcfording.wordpress.com/state-ideology-data/ (accessed June 1, 2013). 
7 http://stateminder.org/variables/ (accessed June 15, 2013). 
8 Thearda.com (accessed October 1, 2013). 
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Table 4: Summary Statistics 
  Observations Mean Std. Deviation 
Index of Marriage Practice Regulation (IMPR) 1,050 12.404 2.46 
Index of Sex Crime Regulation (IMPR) 1,050 12.026 3.26 
Index of Sexual Regulation (ISR) 1,050 24.430 4.83 
Citizen Ideology 1,050 50.339 15.12 
Government Ideology 1,050 50.261 26.64 
Ln Pop Density 1,050 152.117 192.53 
Ln Median HH Income 1,050 10.842 0.16 
Ln % Bachelor degree 1,050 24.417 5.10 
Median Age 1,050 35.441 2.33 
% Catholic 1,050 0.187 0.12 
% Evangelical 1,050 0.158 0.12 
% Protestant 1,050 0.107 0.07 
% Jews 1,050 0.011 0.02 
Racial Fractionalization Index 1,050 0.339 0.16 
Religion Fractionalization Index 1,050 0.590 0.10 
 
Table 5: Correlation Coefficients 
 
ISR IMPR ISCR Citizen  ideology 
Govern
ment 
Ideolo-
gy 
Ln 
Pop 
Den-
sity 
Ln 
Median 
HH 
Income 
Ln % 
Bache-
lor 
degree 
Median 
Age 
Racial 
Fracti-on
alism 
Religious 
Fractiona- 
lisation 
ISR 1.00	
	          IMPR 0.79	 1.00	
	         ISCR 0.89	 0.42	 1.00	
	        Citizen Ideology 0.27	 0.23	 0.23	 1.00
	       Government Ideology 0.19	 0.24	 0.10	 0.60	 1.00
	      Ln Pop Density 0.20	 0.22	 0.12	 0.48	 0.28	 1.00
	     Ln Median HH Income 0.27	 0.26	 0.21	 0.35	 0.14	 0.42	 1.00
	    Ln % Bachelor degre 0.16	 0.24	 0.06	 0.43	 0.18	 0.43	 0.75	 1.00	
	   Median Age 0.21	 0.05	 0.27	 0.46	 0.30	 0.26	 0.06	 0.28	 1.00	
	  Racial Fractionalization 0.11	 0.28	 -0.04	 0.05	 0.10	 0.23	 0.22	 0.26	 -0.09	 1.00
	Religious Fractionalization 0.02	 -0.05	 0.07	 0.03	 0.01	 0.15	 -0.25	 -0.13	 0.24	 -0.06	 1.00
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5 Results     
We investigate the determinants of sexual practices regulation (ISR) and its 
sub-components, index of marriage practice regulation (IMPR) and index of 
sex-crime regulation (ISCR) using spatial lag fixed effects estimators. For each of 
the three dependent variables, we estimate three alternative specifications. First, 
we start with including two ideology variables. We then introduce state median 
household income, median age, education and population density. We then add 
two fractionalization variables- namely religions and racial fractionalization.  
 
Table 6: Determinants of sexual practices’ regulation (ISR)- Spatial Panel Data 
Estimation 
	
(1)	 (2)	 (3)	 (4)	
	
Main	 	
regression	
Direct	
effect	
Indirect	
effect	
Total	 	
effect	
Citizen	Ideology	 0.030***	 0.031***	 0.007***	 0.038***	
	
(0.006)	 (0.006)	 (0.002)	 (0.008)	
Government	Ideology	 -0.007***	 -0.007***	 -0.002***	 -0.009***	
	
(0.002)	 (0.002)	 (0.001)	 (0.003)	
Lambda	 0.233***	 		 		 		
	
(0.051)	 		 		 		
	 	 	 	
Observations	 1,050	 1,050	 1,050	 1,050	
Number	of	states	 50	 50	 50	 50	
 
 
Notes: Estimation done using spatial lag fixed effects panel data estimation. Coefficients 
reported are the sum of direct and indirect effects from contiguous states. Lambda is the 
coefficient estimate of the spatially lagged dependent variable. Standard errors obtained 
using delta method. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
We begin by examining various factors affecting the ISR in Table 6. Column 1 
presents the estimate of equation 1.  While government ideology has slight 
negative impact on ISR, citizen ideology has a positive and statistically 
significant impact. We cannot however ascertain the magnitude of these 
coefficients from column 1. The estimate of the coefficient on the spatially lagged 
dependent variable is positive and statistically significant. This implies that there 
is interdependence between a state and its neighbors in the strictness of ISR. The 
indirect effect captures the impact that covariate has on the conditional mean of 
the dependent variable in other states, while the direct impact captures the 
average effect within a state (LeSage and Pace, 2009). 
In column 2, we provide the direct impact of a state’s own characteristics on its 
ISR while column 3 reports the indirect or spillover effects. Both citizen and 
government ideologies have statistically significant average direct and indirect 
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effects but the direct effect is roughly three times larger than indirect effects. 
Since a higher ISR denotes less regulation of sexual practices, our results indicate 
that a more liberal citizen ideology is associated with a lower regulation of sexual 
practices. Interestingly, liberal government ideology is associated with a more 
regulated sexual practice index, though the magnitude is very small. 
 
Table	 7:	 Determinants	 of	 Sexual	 Practices’	 Regulation	 (ISR)	 -	 Spatial	 Panel	 Data	
Estimation 
  (1)	 (2)	
		 		 		
Citizen	Ideology	 0.017**	 0.019***	
	
(0.007)	 (0.007)	
Government	Ideology	 -0.006**	 -0.005**	
	
(0.002)	 (0.002)	
Ln	Pop	Density	 1.421**	 1.901***	
	
(0.607)	 (0.737)	
Ln	Median	HH	Income	 1.404**	 1.395*	
	
(0.702)	 (0.760)	
Ln	%	Bachelor	degree	 -0.013	 -0.003	
	
(0.026)	 (0.028)	
Median	Age	 0.120**	 0.196***	
	
(0.049)	 (0.058)	
Racial	Fractionalization	Index	
	
-0.543	
	 	
(0.970)	
Religious	Fractionalization	Index	
	
8.584**	
		 		 (3.556)	
Observations	 1,050	 1,050	
Number	of	states	 50	 50	
p	value	of	Lambda	 0.061	 0.087	
Notes: Estimation done using spatial lag fixed effects panel data estimation. Coefficients reported 
are the sum of direct and indirect effects from contiguous states. Lambda is the coefficient 
estimate of the spatially lagged dependent variable. Standard errors obtained using delta method 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
We next include four socio-economic independent variables- population 
density, median household income, % of population with a bachelor’s degree 
and median age (Table 7). To save space, we report the coefficients of their total 
effects (sum of direct and spatial spillover). Citizen ideology continues to be 
associated with less regulation, along with population density, median 
household income and median age. The coefficient on education is not 
statistically significant. In column 2 we also add racial and religious 
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fractionalization variables. While racial fractionalization is not statistically 
significant, religious fractionalization has a positive and statistically significant 
estimate indicating that more religious diversity is associated with a weaker 
index of sexual regulation. All other independent variables, except education, 
continue to be statistically significant with the same signs as in column 1. Also, in 
both model specifications, the estimate of spatially lagged dependent variable is 
statistically significant. 
 We now turn to the two sub-components of ISR. Table 8 provides results 
for the Index of Marriage Practice Regulation (IMPR). 
 
Table	 8:	 Determinants	 of	 Marriage	 Practice	 Regulation	 (IMPR)-	 Spatial	 Panel	 Data	
Estimation 
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
		 		 		 		
Citizen	Ideology	 0.009**	 -0.003	 -0.002	
	
(0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Government	Ideology	 0.002*	 0.003***	 0.003***	
	
(0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Ln	Pop	Density	
	
0.242	 0.469	
	 	
(0.330)	 (0.365)	
Ln	Median	HH	Income	
	
0.462	 0.493	
	 	
(0.380)	 (0.380)	
Ln	%	Bachelor	degree	
	
0.031**	 0.035**	
	 	
(0.014)	 (0.014)	
Median	Age	
	
0.075***	 0.066**	
	 	
(0.027)	 (0.029)	
Racial	Fractionalization	Index	
	 	
-0.880*	
	 	 	
(0.482)	
Religious	Fractionalization	Index	
	 	
-1.620	
		 		 		 (1.777)	
Observations	 1,050	 1,050	 1,050	
Number	of	states	 50	 50	 50	
p	value	of	Lambda	 0.00	 0.09	 0.064	
Notes: Estimation done using spatial lag fixed effects panel data estimation. Coefficients reported 
are the sum of direct and indirect effects from contiguous states. Lambda is the coefficient 
estimate of the spatially lagged dependent variable. Standard errors obtained using delta method 
in parentheses*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Unlike in the case of ISR, both the ideology variables in column 1 are positive 
and statistically significant. Thus, a more liberal citizen and government ideology 
is associated with less regulation on marriage practice. When we include the four 
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socio-economic variables in column 2, citizen’s ideology is no longer statistically 
significant but government ideology continues to be positive and statistically 
significant, along with the education and age variables. In column 3, we also 
include racial and religious fractionalization variables. The results are very 
similar to column 2. In addition, a greater degree of racial fractionalization is 
associated with a more regulated or less liberal marriage practice index.   
 
Table	9:	Determinants	of	Sex	Crime	Regulation	(ISCR)	-	Spatial	Panel	Data	Estimation	
		 (1)	 (2)	 (3)	
		 		 		 		
Citizen	Ideology	 0.009**	 -0.003	 -0.002	
	
(0.003)	 (0.004)	 (0.004)	
Government	Ideology	 0.002*	 0.003***	 0.003***	
	
(0.001)	 (0.001)	 (0.001)	
Ln	Pop	Density	
	
0.242	 0.469	
	 	
(0.330)	 (0.365)	
Ln	Median	HH	Income	
	
0.462	 0.493	
	 	
(0.380)	 (0.380)	
Ln	%	Bachelor	degree	
	
0.031**	 0.035**	
	 	
(0.014)	 (0.014)	
Median	Age	
	
0.075***	 0.066**	
	 	
(0.027)	 (0.029)	
Racial	Fractionalization	Index	
	 	
-0.880*	
	 	 	
(0.482)	
Religious	Fractionalization	Index	
	 	
-1.620	
		 		 		 (1.777)	
Observations	 1,050	 1,050	 1,050	
Number	of	states	 50	 50	 50	
p	value	of	Lambda	 0.00	 0.09	 0.064	
Notes: Estimation done using spatial lag fixed effects panel data estimation. Coefficients 
reported are the sum of direct and indirect effects from contiguous states. Lambda is the 
coefficient estimate of the spatially lagged dependent variable. Standard errors obtained 
using the delta method in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Finally, Table 9 reports factors affecting the Index of Sex Crime Regulation 
(ISCR). In the case of ISCR, the coefficient estimate of the spatially lagged 
dependent variable was not statistically significant, indicating the absence of 
across-state spillover effects. Hence, we only report the direct effects of the 
covariates on ISCR. Column 1 indicates that a more leftist citizen’s ideology is 
associated with a less regulation of sex crimes while government ideology has a 
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negative association indicating a more leftist ideology sees more regulation of sex 
crimes. Including other state-level covariates does not affect the magnitude or 
statistical significance of these variables. In addition, population density and 
median income are associated with a freer ISCR while education is associated 
with more regulation (column 2). In column 3, we also include the race and 
religion fractionalization variables. Citizen ideology and government ideology 
continue to have the same signs and statistical significance. Education continues 
to be associated with more regulation while population density, median age and 
religious fractionalization are associated with a less regulation of sex crimes.  
6 Conclusions  
Using a novel dataset, this paper investigates various factors affecting 
regulations of sexual practices in the United States, as well as two underlying 
dimensions, marriage practice regulations and sex-crime regulations. We account 
for the cross-state spillovers in the dependent variables as well as unobserved 
state-specific heterogeneity using a spatial lag fixed effects estimator. We find 
that median household income has a positive impact on ISR, supporting the 
hypothesis that reducing sexual regulations is a normal good. A key result is that 
more liberal citizen ideology has a positive impact on ISR while government 
ideology has a negative, albeit relatively smaller, impact on ISR. This result is 
robust to inclusion of various demographic controls. Another finding of this 
paper is that percentage of population with a bachelor’s degree or above has the 
effect of weakening marriage practice regulations but has the opposite effect on 
sex-crime regulations. Based on our findings, we conclude that marriage practice 
regulations are positively impacted by a more leftist government ideology, 
higher median age and education. Finally, citizen ideology, median age and 
population density positively impact sex crime regulations whereas government 
ideology, percentage of population with Bachelor’s degree and religious 
fractionalization as associated with a lower index of sex crime regulations.   
Some improvements can be made in a future work. Regulation around sexual 
practices evolves incrementally. Our sample covers the past twenty-one years 
but the index has been relatively stable within each state. It would be of interest 
to see how these indices have evolved over the longer period of time. 
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